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Introduction
Commuting expenses reduce the income tax liability in many European countries, in particular in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 1 Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland (see Potter et al., 2006) . In Germany this regulation has often been changed and has been under debate for decades.
Advocates of income tax deductions 2 emphasize that they reduce distortions concerning individual labor supply (Wrede, 2000; Wrede, 2001; Sinn, 2003) , eliminate spatial misallocations in particular concerning working location decisions (Gasche, 2006; Wrede, 2009), or improve aggregate productivity if it is spatially di¤erentiated (Wrede, 2009, Borck and Wrede, 2009) . In contrast, objections against tax deductions arise (i) since commuting subsidies might induce negative externalities and, thus, constitute a 'bad' , (ii) for reasons of equity because high-income households bene…t the most (e.g. Kloas and Kuhfeld, 2003) , (iii) because it discriminates in favor of commuters who can avoid high rents in central cities but at the same time bene…t from subsidized living at low-rent suburbs (Wrede, 2004; DIW, 2008) , or (iv) since costs arising on account of privately caused decisions concerning commuting should not be subsidized (Gasche, 2004; Wrede, 2004; Richter, 2004; . Richter (2004) shows clearly that the issue whether commuting expenses should be tax deductible depends on whether it is privately or occupationally caused. They should be deductible only in the latter case because they are indispensable for earning income and, thus, should be exempted from the income tax base. This so called net-principle is the main reasoning in favor of tax deductions in Germany. The German Advisory Board for Economic Development (SVR, 2003) suggests that about 50% of the tax deduction is occupational caused. Wrede (2004) considers a deduction rate of slightly less than the current rate of 0.30 e/km as optimal. Bach (2003) , , Donges et al. (2008) , Schulze (2009) argue in favor of a reduction of deductibility. In contrast, Richter (2004) takes his presumption that employer do not pay higher wages for commuters as evidence that commuting is almost entirely privately caused and, therefore, should not be tax deductible at all. 1 For example in Germany income tax deduction of commuting expenses caused total income tax savings (or governmental income tax losses) of commuters of about 4 billion e in 2006 . 2 In the following we only use the term 'tax deduction'. This short review shows that the pros and cons are well known. However, the urban/transport economics literature lacks in quantitative studies analyzing economic and spatial e¤ects regarding tax deductibility of commuting expenses. Even in technical papers employing modeling approaches (Wrede, 2001; Wrede, 2009 ) the optimal size of the deductions is debatable because it depends on the speci…c features (not) implemented in the theoretical models. Therefore, optimal deduction rates are not yet fully derived since the di¤erent lines of reasoning are yet not integrated in one uni…ed approach. For example, the models used in the literature do not simultaneously implement spatial location and labor supply decisions along with distortionary taxation because such an approach is not analytically solvable. Moreover, the models rely on restrictive assumptions concerning the design of the income taxation scheme and the structure of households living in the urban area (they usually neglect household heterogeneity). Consequently, it is not at all clear how e¢ ciency e¤ects concerning residential and employment location distortions, labor supply distortions, e¤ects on externalities such as congestion, or e¤ects on travel mode choice and on welfare distribution behave if all those features are simultaneously considered. This is a serious gap in the debate because the consequences of not integrating these important features are not clear in advance. 3 Would this either imply a lower or a higher deduction rate than the current level? Is there a strong e¤ect on urban sprawl and the environment, e.g., characterized by changes in travel related CO 2 emissions? This is our point of departure. We -to the best of our knowledge for the …rst time -apply a spatial general equilibrium model calibrated to an average German metropolitan area to analyze the impacts of commuting subsidies characterized by tax deduction. Our focus is on the optimal tax deduction rate and the impact of varying the deduction rate on the urban economy. In addition, we go a step further in comparison to the literature where it is usually assumed that subsidies are either …nanced by lump-sum or income taxes. This might be useful from a systematic point of view. Nonetheless, if policymakers adjust taxes it is more appropriate to consider taxes which are less distortionary than an income tax. This is the reason why we implement revenue neutral tax reforms where we look at 3 Of course, there is a large body of literature on transport subsidies in general (see e.g. De Borger and Wuyts, 2009; Parry and Small, 2009; Borck and Wrede, 2009; Su and DeSalvo, 2008; Borck and Wrede, 2008; Brueckner, 2005; Borck and Wrede, 2005; van Dender, 2003; Calthrop, 2001; Martin, 2001; Zenou, 2000) applying either non-spatial or spatial approaches. Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2011) provide a review of the corresponding literature and summarize the main …ndings. Nonetheless, except for Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2011) , all these papers neglect the simultaneous consideration of these features and there is no corresponding study focusing on income tax deduction of commuting expenses. di¤erent taxes used to …nance tax deductions of commuting expenses. In particular, the following funding schemes are considered: income tax, sales tax and energy tax 4 funding.
This allows to consider a wide range of di¤erentiated funding related e¤ects. For example, funding tax deduction by sales or energy taxes also implies an increase in shopping trip costs, i.e. the costs of non productive time use while in particular energy tax funding may also induce changes in travel mode choice.
The model we apply is a numerical spatial polycentric city model in the tradition of Anas and Xu (1999) , Anas and Rhee (2006; and had been extended by Hirte (2010a, 2010b) in di¤erent ways. In the model residential, employment and shopping location decisions as well as labor supply decisions are endogenous. Moreover, the approach takes household heterogeneity, progressive income taxation, travel mode choice and endogenous automobile congestion, gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions into account. These features have never been simultaneously treated in a spatial economic model when studying tax deduction of commuting expenses.
Our results suggest that the current level of the tax deduction rate is about one third of the optimal level if it is …nanced by income taxes. Then, the optimal deduction rate were, on the one hand, about the same size as monetary round-trip commuting cost but, on the other hand, still considerably smaller than full economic (incl. time cost) roundtrip commuting cost. If, however, a change in the tax base occurs the subsidy should be considerably higher. With respect to urban welfare and environmental e¤ects the combination of an increase in tax deductibility with energy tax funding turns out to be the best policy. In this case there is a signi…cant decline in the congestion externality and in travel related CO 2 emissions. Furthermore, the di¤erent funding scheme cause heterogeneous redistribution e¤ects. Surprisingly, the analyses also suggest quite small impacts on urban sprawl. According to these …ndings, tax deduction of commuting expenses contributes only to a minor extent to suburbanization.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides a short theoretical discussion of the e¢ ciency aspect of tax deductions under di¤erent funding schemes. In Section 3 we describe the simulation model. In Section 4 we display and discuss the main results of the commuting subsidization policies. Eventually, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions.
Theoretical Background
In the following we discuss a worker's decisions in a stylized urban setting. This shows that tax deductions of commuting expenses may distort a worker's non-spatial as well as spatial decisions and how the results might be a¤ected by the di¤erentiated funding schemes considered. This also provides a basis for discussing the e¢ ciency e¤ects in the full- ‡edged spatial model of the urban economy employed in the simulation.
A Simple Spatial Model to Illustrate Basic E¤ects
The city we have in mind is monocentric concerning shopping activities, i.e. there is a Central Shopping District (CSD), but not with respect to housing and employment. The place of residence (employment) is de…ned by its distance from the CSD, denoted by
x (y). We assume, for the time being, that y
x. Accordingly, commuting distance is denoted by X = x y. Each identical worker chooses the number of shopping trips z, which is equivalent to the level of consumption, housing consumption q and leisure`, the residential location x as well as the working location y to maximize utility u = u (z; q;`) subject to a monetary budget and a time constraint. The budget constraint is
It states that expenditures for shopping (incl. shopping trip cost) and housing equal (labor) income net of taxes and commuting costs plus tax deductions of commuting expenses.
The monetary cost of each shopping trip is p + cx where p denotes the mill price of the composite consumption good and c denotes monetary travel cost per round-trip shopping kilometer. The price of housing per square meter and period is r (x). The daily net return to labor (1 m ) w(y)L is the after tax wage where the hourly wage rate w (y) might di¤er according to the location of the workplace; m is the marginal wage tax rate;
and L is the …x number of working hours per workday. C denotes monetary commuting cost per round-trip kilometer; is the tax deduction rate of commuting expenses; and D is the number of workdays (working shifts).
The time constraint is
The time endowment E is used for working, commuting, shopping trips and leisure. T and t denote travel time per round-trip kilometer required for commuting and shopping, respectively. The consolidated full economic budget constraint then is
is the value of time (VOT) of the representative urban worker.
Di¤erentiating utility subject to Eq.
(3) with respect to z; q;`; y and x yields the …rst-order conditions (FOC) for the optimal decisions with respect to the non-spatial variables z, q and`uù
as well as the …rst-order conditions for the optimal spatial location decisions encompassing the working location choice (provided D > 0)
and the condition for the optimal residential location (slope of the bid-rent curve)
These conditions show that the income tax, m , distorts all decisions. Deductions can neutralize the e¤ect of the income tax on the VOT if X = w (y) L. While this eliminates the distortions regarding the non-spatial decisions (Eq. (5)) it, however, does not eliminate the distortions concerning the spatial location decisions (Eq. (6)) and (Eq. (7)). As a consequence, there is no optimal subsidy or tax deduction rate eliminating all distortions arising from income taxation.
The Model with German Institutions
Because further distortionary taxes exist in Germany tax interaction e¤ects and tax revenue recycling e¤ects are important issues (see also Parry and Bento, 2001 ). Therefore we have to discuss e¤ects of tax deductions simultaneously with other taxes which might be used to …nance the commuting subsidy. In the following we extend the previous model by adding German consumption taxes and energy taxes and take di¤erent travel modes, m, into account.
In German income taxation scheme is progressive and exactly implemented in the simulation model. For the time being we assume that there is a general tax allowance, A; and, in addition, workers are allowed to deduct XD from the income tax base, thus the tax liability is m (w (y) LD A XD) Then, the monetary budget constraint turns into
The workers time constraint is again Eq. (2). After forming the consolidated full economic budget constraint the corresponding …rst-order conditions for the worker's choice problem encompass the FOCs concerning non-spatial decisions
and the FOCs concerning the employment location and residential location decision
is the VOT of a worker facing commuting distance X.
Eliminating the distortion in the leisure-housing decision (Eq. (10)) requires deductions to neutralize all taxes in the VOT, hence, m X = m w (y) L+ p CX +(1 + z ) f F X. This allows neither to eliminate the distortions in the leisure-consumption decision (Eq. (9)), nor to eliminate the distortions in the spatial location decisions (Eq. (12) and Eq. (13)).
The FOCs also show that the way deductions are …nanced is important because each tax enters the FOCs in another way.
Tax Deductions, Tax Funding and the VOT
Next we focus on the VOT as a crucial variable concerning the workers's individual decisions. The VOT represents the (average) net return from labor as well as the opportunity costs of time. Therefore it provides a link between labor supply and location decisions, two of the features we integrate in our approach. Deriving the impact of a revenue neutral change in the deduction rate on the VOT also requires to consider the e¤ect of the tax instrument used for funding deductions.
Di¤erentiating Eq. (13) with respect to the tax deduction rate (given prices) yields
where h 2 fm; z; p; f g denotes the tax used for funding the subsidy. The …rst term on the right-hand side (RHS) represents the direct e¤ect of a change in the tax deduction rate . An increase in directly raises the VOT by m X= [L + T (m) X] which is the higher the higher the marginal tax rate (the higher the income), and the longer the commuting distance. The second term on the RHS is the funding e¤ect accruing on account of changes in tax rates required to …nance tax deductions. The third and fourth term on the RHS comprise relocations of the places of employment and of residence as a response to the change in deductions and the corresponding change in tax rates. We cannot derive the exact e¤ects without simultaneously di¤erentiating the whole system of FOCs. We refrain from doing this and focus on the funding e¤ect in the following.
Calculating the funding e¤ect gives
According to Eq. (15) each tax discussed a¤ects the VOT negatively. 6 There is, however, a remarkable di¤erence between income and other taxes. While the funding e¤ect is negative and proportional to commuting distance X for sales tax (d z ; d p ) and energy tax funding (d f ), the impact of the commuting distance in the case of income tax funding (d m ) is positive. The reason for the latter is that tax deductions depend on the marginal income tax rate. As a consequence income tax funding favors longer commuting trips while the other funding schemes punish longer commuting trips. Accordingly, ceteris paribus urban sprawl 7 and congestion are expected to be more pronounced with income tax funding than under other policies. However, with income tax funding there is a further e¤ect, w (y) L, independent from commuting distance. This e¤ect lowers the VOT to a relatively large extent compared with the commuting distance dependent e¤ects under the alternative 6 For the case of income tax funding this implies assuming w (y) L X > 0: 7 There is no standardized procedure how to measure urban sprawl. Nechyba and Walsh (2004) point out that a common way to document the presence of urban sprawl is to look …rst at the evolving relationship of population levels between suburbs and central cities. Anas and Rhee (2006) use changes in the daily average travel time per worker as a measure of sprawl. Ewing et al. (2002) operationalize, or measure, sprawl using several variables that represent di¤erent aspects of development patterns (e.g. neighborhood mix of homes, jobs, and services). Brueckner (2000) de…nes sprawl as excessive spatial growth of cities while Su and DeSalvo (2008) refer to the decentralization of urban population. We measure sprawl as changes in average commuting distance, the spatial expansion of the urban area and the decentralization of employment and residences. funding schemes. But since a lower VOT discourages labor supply and, in addition, favors slower travel modes such as walking, the e¤ects on urban sprawl, congestion and emissions are in fact ambiguous.
Furthermore, the e¤ects of sales and energy tax funding depend on the travel mode chosen. The higher gasoline usage the stronger the adverse e¤ects on the VOT imposed by energy tax and sales tax funding. This provides an incentive for commuters to diminish these adverse e¤ects by switching to alternative, i.e. less gasoline intensive, travel modes such as walking or public transport. As this lowers emissions and congestion it improves welfare. The magnitude of the funding e¤ect also depends on the degree of change in the respective tax rate. This, in turn, depends on the tax base and the respective behavior of the household, e.g. travel mode choice. Because there is a tax allowance on income, the income tax rate presumably increases more than other tax rates to …nance the same change in the deduction rate. This induces stronger e¢ ciency losses in comparison to funding by other than the income tax.
Let us summarize:
Tax deductions raise the value of time entailing higher labor supply primarily of high-skilled workers. Unfortunately, this is attended with more sprawl, more congestion and higher emissions.
Tax funding impairs this positive e¤ect on labour supply through lowering the VOT. This, in turn, mitigates the adverse e¤ects of tax deductions on urban sprawl, congestion and emissions.
Income tax funding rewards long-distance commuting while the other funding schemes sanction longer commuting trips. However, the commuting distance independent part of the funding e¤ect under income tax funding lowers the VOT relatively. As a consequence, the net e¤ect on, e.g., congestion is in fact ambiguous.
Energy tax funding discriminates against commuting by automobile, sales taxes do it to some degree, too. Hence, both imply less road tra¢ c and, thus, less congestion and emissions.
Having discussed distortions and various e¤ects induced by tax deductions the next step would be to discuss optimal instruments. Because there is no full set of instruments a second-best issue arises and the optimal subsidy has to be derived in an optimal tax approach. The appropriate approach would be to maximize indirect utility subject to the …rst-order conditions of the location decisions (reservation wage, Eq. (11), and the slope of the bid-rent, Eq. ( (12)), the public budget constraint, resource constraints and conditions concerning local land and local labor markets. Because this cannot be solved analytically without setting additional restriction we direct our attention to the simulation model. Nevertheless, the discussion above suggests that it is useful to di¤erentiate subsidies and taxes for di¤erent travel modes or di¤erent travel purposes.
The Spatial Simulation Model
The spatial urban general equilibrium model we use is an extension of the model described in Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2010a) . Here we add an endogenous city fringe to the model required to look at tax deduction induced impacts on urban sprawl. In the following we only provide a description of the model's main characteristics.
The model explicitly takes into account the interactions between di¤erent markets (land, labor, commodities), households and …rms in nine urban districts. The innermost zone of the city provides the best accessibility and, thus, will endogenously become the city center. All zones have a diameter of 4.5 kilometers so that the whole urban area expands over 40.5 km. Supply of land increases with distance from the city center but is …xed for all but the outer suburbs where land supply is endogenous. The urban locations are linked via a transport network with given distances between the centers of the locations.
A su¢ ciently large number of identical and competitive …rms produce in each zone a zone speci…c commodity by applying a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines land and labor supplied by low-skilled and high-skilled workers. These commodities are sold at place of production. The …rms located in the same zone are identical but goods di¤er across locations implying spatial product di¤erentiation.
Urban households are heterogeneous concerning idiosyncratic tastes for urban locations.
In addition, household type heterogeneity is taken into account by di¤erentiating households with respect to employment status (non-working households and working households each encompassing one potentially employed person) and skill level 8 (low-skilled and high- 8 The di¤erentiation with respect to skill level applies to working households. skilled households). Idiosyncratic tastes and household type heterogeneity imply mixed land use and di¤erentiated travel patterns within the urban area (see also Anas et al., 1998; Train, 2003; Tscharaktschiew and Hirte, 2010b) .
Households endogenously decide where to reside, where to work (working households), where and how much to shop, how much labor to supply and, thus, how often to commute (working households), how much land to rent, and which travel mode to use. The residential location i and the employment location j (working households) determine the speci…c location choice sets fig and fi; jg ; respectively. Households face a simultaneous decision problem in terms of consumption quantities (composite commodity Z, housing approximated by lot size q and leisure`) and location decisions (residential and employment locations). The random utility function of a typical (working) household is The household maximizes utility with respect to consumption (location speci…c shopping), housing, leisure, and the number of workdays (only working households) subject to the budget and time constraints, (similar to Eq. (8) and Eq. (2)). It also faces a discrete mode choice problem concerning travel modes walking, public transport and automobile available for the trip purposes commuting and shopping. A discrete choice approach is also applied to determine residential and working locations of the households based on U .
All spatial location decisions implicitly determine commuting and shopping trip distances, frequencies and -along with travel mode speci…c travel speeds -travel times. Individual automobile travel causes three kinds of externalities: congestion (travel time delays), additional gasoline consumption, and additional CO 2 emissions, all caused by the fact that the marginal car driver may a¤ect travel speed of all other drivers being on the road.
Since all travel decisions are endogenous, the extent of the externalities is endogenous as well. Automobile travel times, gasoline consumption and CO 2 emissions are endogenously determined and speci…ed by empirically determined functional relationships.
The federal government levies progressive income taxes, sales taxes and energy (gasoline) taxes, grants tax deductions to working households and income transfers to non-working households and redistributes -according to …scal interdependencies among public authorities in Germany -shares of its revenues to the local urban government. The federal tax revenues not redistributed to the urban private households and the city government are used for public consumption consisting of purchasing locally produced commodities. The city government receives its shares of federal tax revenues and levies a local lump-sum tax to …nance local goods such as roads. Infrastructure costs consist of opportunity costs due to land used for infrastructure. Absentee landowners use their rent income and an external transport sector monetary travel costs (except for travel-related taxes) accruing from urban travel activities to purchase urban commodities.
In Germany there is a progressive federal income taxation scheme. The average tax rate increases with an increase in taxable income (see Figure 1 ). Commuting subsidies are granted as deductions from the income tax. Basically the treatment of tax deductibility of commuting expenses is implemented as it is applied in Germany. This means it is taken into account that the individual taxpayer could also deduct a general employee tax allowance (see also the parameter A in the theoretical model) from the income tax base (currently 920 e/year) as long as this allowance exceeds aggregate commuting and further non-commuting expenditures. 9 Adding endogenous land supply at the urban fringe is an important feature concerning the …ndings. Nonetheless it does not change the benchmark in comparison to a model with …xed land endowment. This is the reason why we do not present the calibration and the characteristics of the benchmark city in the following. The reader is referred to Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2010a) . 9 Consequently, this treatment allows to account for the fact commuters whose residential and employment locations are close to each other could actually not directly bene…t from higher deductions up to a certain level because aggregate deductible commuting and (non-commuting) expenses do not exceed the general employee tax allowance. The reason is that in such a case the taxpayer would behave rational by deduction of the general employee tax allowance.
Simulation and Results

Research Design
Our research design is as follows: we vary the deduction rate in the range of 0:0 1:3 e/km. The benchmark level is 0.30 e/km. This implies that we consider an upper ceiling of the tax deductibility rate which, on the one hand, exceeds monetary commuting costs but, on the other hand, falls below full economic commuting costs (see Table 1 ). This range allows to …nd optimal subsidy rates under income tax funding. We implement four scenarios di¤ering in the way tax deductions are …nanced:
Policy 1 (income tax funding): varying the (marginal) income tax rates, Policy 2 (general sales tax funding): adjusting the sales tax rate holding constant the reduced sales tax rate on public transport, Policy 3 (energy tax funding): adjusting the energy tax rate, Policy 4 (multiple sales tax funding): adjusting, …rst, the reduced sales tax rate on public transport (holding the general sales tax rate …x) and, then, adjusting the general sales tax. If deductions are raised the reduced sales tax rate is incrementally increased until it reaches the level of the general sales tax rate, then both tax rates are raised together. If deductions decline the reduced sales tax rate is incrementally lowered until zero, then the general sales tax rate is additionally lowered.
Policies 2, 3 and 4 also constitute a change in the tax base away from income to consumption and energy taxation. We distinguish two scenarios concerning the adjustment of the sales tax rate. Raising the general sales tax rate but holding the reduced tax rate constant, i.e. Policy 2, implies a raise in the subsidy to public transport. In contrast, raising the reduced sales tax rate on public transport until it reaches the level of the general sales tax rate i.e. Policy 4, implies a reduction in the subsidy to public transport.
Spatial and Economic E¤ects
Spatial E¤ects
Starting with spatial e¤ects, Table 2 displays the results for three selected levels of the tax deduction rate. The results are printed as changes compared to the benchmark level.
The general pattern is in accordance with intuition. Abolishing tax deductions lowers average commuting distances and causes an incremental shrinkage of the city as well as a decline concerning suburbanization of residences and jobs. Raising the commuting subsidy induces diametrical e¤ects which are, however, surprisingly small. A doubling of the deduction rate from currently 0.30 e/km to 0.60 e/km leads to a very small increase in the average commuting distance of only 0.6% to 1.5%. An increase to 1.20 e/km, after all an increase of 400% compared with the initial level, increases the average commuting distance of at most 5.4%. Also very small is the percentage change in the city size. The urban area increases by 0.14% to 0.52% as a response to a doubling of the deduction rate. This is very small in comparison with the results of Su and De Salvo (2008) who found much higher e¤ects for car subsidies in the U.S. (an elasticity of about 0.1). One reason for this weak impact in our study is that funding subsidies provokes an countervailing raise of the tax rate used for funding. Another reason is that shopping trip costs do hardly change by commuting subsidies. Furthermore, we consider di¤erent types of individuals where non-working households do not receive commuting subsidies and low-skilled workers face only a small subsidy on account of their low marginal wage tax rate. Given that, abolishing commuting subsidies is not an instrument to lower sprawl substantially. The gross e¤ects on residential and job relocation are also relatively small. Even raising the tax deduction rate to 1.20 e/km prompts at most 7000 workers or a percentage of unity to relocate from the city to the suburbs. These …ndings query the standard objection against commuting subsidies, namely, that they are an important cause for suburbanization. Accordingly, abolishing the tax deduction rate of commuting expenses is not a very e¤ective device to reduce sprawl or commuting distances. The most interesting result is Policy 3 (curve with squares). Because the energy tax constitutes a tax mainly on automobile usage, reducing the tax o¤sets the positive e¤ect of a lower deduction rate on congestion. Therefore congestion exacerbates. In contrast, congestion strongly declines if the energy tax rate is raised. The reason is that more and more workers switch their travel mode toward public transport. Because this does not a¤ect the level of commuting subsidies, this policy implies a strong decline in congestion.
Doubling the deduction rate reduces congestion by about 10%. This e¤ect is non-linear.
Concerning congestion a high deduction rate plus a high energy tax imposes the strongest positive e¤ect. This policy discriminates in favor of public transport usage. Kleven, 2004) . This raises welfare. On the other hand, the increase in tax deductions implicitly lowers the taxation on the externality and, thus, lowers welfare (see Sandmo, 1975) . A comparison with the absentee landowners shows that gains and losses are also capitalized in rents, as the similar run of the curves indicates.
Aggregate Welfare and Environmental E¤ects
The e¤ects on travel related CO 2 emissions are small. Even a shift of the deduction rate to 1.30 e/km raises CO 2 emissions only by about 3% in comparison to the benchmark, whereas abolishing tax deductions lowers CO 2 emissions only by about 2%.
General Sales Tax Funding (Policy 2)
Funding tax deductions by general sales taxes induces the same sign but stronger e¤ects than income tax funding (see the upper right panel of Figure 4 ). Abolishing tax deductions lowers welfare twice as strong as with income tax funding. An increase in tax deductions implies a much stronger and almost linear increase in welfare. At a deduction rate of 1.00 e/km welfare improves by about 430 million e. Because this policy induces a relative reduction of distortionary labor taxation it constitutes a shift toward stronger taxation of time used non-productively. This also slightly dampens the negative e¤ect of the deductions on congestion by raising the full economic travel cost of shopping.
Interestingly, tax deduction induced e¤ects on the labor market increases incomes in the city which causes aggregate consumption and, thus, shopping (trip) activities actually to increase. Because of the similar pattern in regard to changes in congestion the e¤ects on CO 2 emissions are almost the same as in the case of income tax funding.
Energy Tax Funding (Policy 3)
The results regarding energy tax funding are displayed in the lower left panel of Figure 4 .
Abolishing tax deductibility diminishes welfare, which is almost the same compared with sales tax funding. The gains from raising deductions are higher compared to those accruing under consumption tax funding. Taxing gasoline taxes non productive use of time (e.g. travel) and, in addition, imposes a stronger taxation on the congestion externality.
The most outstanding result is that this policy is the only one considered which achieves a strong reduction concerning CO 2 emissions, while the other policies entail a raise in emissions. The reduction mainly stems from, …rst, a reduction in congestion and associated with this lower automobile emissions emissions per vehicle kilometer and, second, a switch in travel mode choice away from emission intensive automobile road tra¢ c.
Multiple Sales Tax Funding (Policy 4)
The trends are the same than with consumption taxes. However, the strong impact on congestion caused by the changes in the sales tax on public transport implies that welfare e¤ects around the benchmark level di¤er from the welfare e¤ects with general sales tax funding. In particular, a local welfare maximum is reached at a deduction rate of 0.22 e/km and a global minimum at the deduction rate of 0.41 e/km. Also with respect to this funding procedure e¤ects are capitalized in rents but the e¤ect is less distinctive. bene…t from a decrease and su¤er from an increase in the deduction rate. First, they also contribute to …nancing the subsidy and second, they also su¤er from congestion, even though to a smaller extent than working city residents. The dotted lines in Figure 5 represent the equivalent variation of low-skilled households. In general low-skilled workers bene…t from commuting subsidies which are -according to the current institutional arrangement of the tax deduction policy in Germany-also granted for public transport usage. Their gains are the lower the stronger their contribution to …nancing the subsidy and the higher their labor supply is taxed which is the case with income tax funding (Policy 1). Because their tax burden is the lowest under energy tax funding they prefer Policy 3. However, with multiple sales tax funding (Policy 4) their bene…ts and losses around the benchmark deviate from general trends. Here, a reduction of the subsidy to public transport required to …nance higher tax deductions adversely a¤ects the low-skilled workers.
Aggregate Distribution E¤ects
Welfare changes of the high-skilled workers are printed as solid curves in Figure 5 . They are very di¤erently a¤ected depending on the funding scheme. Income tax funding (Policy 1) makes them worse o¤ because this directly taxes their labor supply and counteracts the positive e¤ect of the deductibility (see also Eq. (15)). Their tax burden is the lowest with sales tax funding (Policy 2). With energy tax funding (Policy 3), however, two opposite e¤ects are at work. While they bene…t from a reduction in congestion they su¤er from the 11 Aggregate distribution e¤ects take the relative shares of the calibrated number of the di¤erent household types into account. Because the number of urban households di¤ers among the di¤erent household types (Non-working households: 586,250; low-skilled working households: 931,000; high-skilled working households: 232,750) aggregate distribution e¤ects may di¤er from those accuing on an individual household level basis (see below). stronger taxation of automobile travel. Because of the fact that the congestion externality decreases with an increase gasoline taxation the …rst e¤ect is relatively strong close to the benchmark level, the latter e¤ects is predominant for higher deduction rates implying a decline in welfare.
To summarize: from the perspective of the non-working households the best policy is a deduction rate of about 0.18 e/km together with a stronger subsidy on public transport (multiple sales tax funding). The low-skilled workers as a whole are better o¤ with energy tax funding and higher deductions and the group of high-skilled workers as a whole gains the most under general sales tax funding and higher deductions.
Acceptance of Policies
An individual worker is probably more concerned with changes in his relative wealth as well as in his individual payo¤s in comparison to other income groups. This will be important concerning his acceptance of policies. Therefore we also consider the equivalent variations of di¤erent groups in per capita terms to gain an insight into the level of acceptance of di¤erent policies (see Figure 6 ). Of course, the inhabitants of the metropolitan area cannot decide on federal policy. Nonetheless, metropolitan areas might lobby in favor of one of those policies. Three large cities are even able to vote on such a policy in the Federal Council of Germany (Bundesrat) because they coincide with a German state (Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen). Furthermore, cities'inhabitants vote on representatives for the German parliament (Bundestag).
While aggregate distribution e¤ects imply that higher deductions cause a redistribution in favor of the low-skilled workers, looking at distribution e¤ects in per capita terms (see Figure 6 ) reveals that the high-skilled workers bene…t considerably more than the low-skilled with higher deductions by general sales tax or multiple sales tax funding. There is no policy most favored by more than one group of urban households in terms of individual welfare. The non-working households (dashed curves) prefer reducing deductions along with multiple sales tax funding, low-skilled workers (dotted curves) prefer higher deductions …nanced by energy taxes (as absentee landowners do, see Figure 4 ), whereas high-skilled workers (solid curves) most favor higher tax deductions …nanced by general sales taxes. Though, lower skilled workers constitute a small majority (931, 000) in comparison to the other households (819,000), they might not be able to push their representatives to vote for this policy. To achieve this it is useful that more than one group agrees on a speci…c policy. Given that, higher deductions …nanced by energy taxes or general sales taxes are the two policies unambiguously advantaging both groups of workers in comparison to the benchmark -though the distribution e¤ects are totally different. Unfortunately, because high-skilled workers lose with income tax funding and even with a low level of multiple sales taxation and low-skilled workers might lose with multiple sales tax funding both groups have to worry if they push a raise in deductions when the funding scheme applied by policymakers is uncertain. If their representatives have to compromise to achieve higher deductions this might be even worse for them than the benchmark. Moreover, if only a small increase in tax deductibility is politically feasible, the low-skilled workers might even be better o¤ if deductions are reduced under multiple sales tax funding, though the possible gains per household are less than 100 e/year.
These could be the reasons why the current policy arrangement seems to be acceptable by the working households. Even the non-workers might accept the current situation because reducing deductions provide them a welfare gain of at most 50 e/year which is only fraction of their yearly income.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the tax deductibility of commuting expenses by applying a spatial urban general equilibrium simulation model to an average German metropolitan area. Although there is large body of literature analyzing commuting subsidies or transport subsidies in general, only a restricted number of papers theoretically analyzes commuting subsidies in the form of tax deductions. This paper contributes to the literature by providing for the …rst time an insight into the magnitude of the e¤ects of tax deduction policies by implementing several institutional details of the German tax system in regard to tax deduction (in particular non-linear progressive income taxation).
In addition, the approach takes into account the following features that have never been simultaneously treated in a spatial setting when studying tax deduction of commuting expenses: endogenous labor supply decisions and location decisions where the urban area is not restricted to be monocentric, household heterogeneity by considering multiple household types di¤erentiated by skills and employment status, commuting and non-commuting (shopping) trips, di¤erent funding schemes, travel mode choice, travel related externalities such as congestion, and feedback e¤ects between urban land, labor and commodity markets.
Concerning income tax funding (usually considered in the related literature) our results suggest that the optimal tax deduction rate in terms of welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolitan area is about three times as large (0.90 e/km) as the current deduction rate in Germany. The endogeneity of the urban fringe is the main reason why this optimal deduction rate is even higher than we found in another paper (0.50 e/km, see Tscharaktschiew and Hirte, 2011) . This rate would then be close to monetary commuting costs needed for a commuting round-trip but would still be far below full economic commuting costs needed for such a trip (see Table 1 ). However, if negative e¤ects of urban sprawl or higher CO 2 emissions are taken into account the optimal deduction rate is likely to be considerably lower. Moreover, the maximum aggregate welfare gain is very low and amounts to about 50 million e/year (on average about 30 e/year per household). The results also indicate that the tax deduction rate hardly contributes to urban sprawl according to the de…nition of sprawl used here. There is the expected positive relationship (raising the tax deduction rate raises average commuting distance and the spatial expansion of the urban area) but the magnitude of the e¤ect is very small -e.g. the elasticity is about 0.01 (0.003) with respect to commuting distance (the size of the urban area). 12
Hence, concerning suburbanization the deductibility of commuting expenses is suggested to be only from a minor importance, at least in the case of German cities. Positive e¤ects of tax deductions on labor supply and negative e¤ects on congestion are also very small due to countervailing e¤ects on the VOT accruing under income tax funding.
However, one might ask why shall income taxes be used for funding? Usually the reasoning is that income tax deductions shall be …nanced by income taxes in order to avoid mixing a tax reform (change in the tax base) with a commuting subsidy policy via tax deductions.
However, in a spatial world with externalities and other time consuming activities funding subsidies by other taxes could be justi…ed from an optimal tax point of view (see Kleven, 2004; and Sandmo, 1975) .
12 Evaluated at a tax deduction level of 0.6 e/km. Therefore, we have also looked at alternative funding procedures. Then the positive labor supply e¤ects of the subsidy can be combined with a less harmful tax on general consumption or energy. This is equivalent to a change in the tax base in favor of taxing non- This, however, is a task for future research. 
